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financing their organizations through involvement in the drug trade. This
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understand the threat faced by the new generation of jihadists in the
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micro-level of how lower level trafficking, drug dealing and petty
criminal activity, combined with prison radicalization and ties to the
black market and illicit underworld, combine to present a new spin on a
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counter, given already poor community-police cooperation and relations
in the marginalized communities throughout the West. Further, the
threat from drug trafficking at the micro-level can be equally as
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Introduction 
Violent-non-state actors, including terrorists and insurgents, are constantly 
seeking new ways to fund their organizations.1  Following the end of the Cold 
War, superpowers withdrew their financing of proxies, making states weaker 
and more susceptible to attack.  Similarly, terrorist and insurgent groups that 
previously relied on state financing were forced to either become criminals or 
fade away.  To account for the newfound dearth of funding, non-state actors 
developed broad portfolios of illicit activities.  At various points, al-Qaida 
relied heavily on funding from wealthy patrons in the Gulf and charities that 
served as fronts for more nefarious purposes.2  In Southeast Asia, kidnapping 
for ransom by Abu Sayyaf Group and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
(MILF) are further evidence of the blurred lines between criminality and 
terrorism.3  Terrorist groups will engage in nearly any activity that generates a 
profit and have demonstrated an ability to adapt to losses in one area by 
aggressively expanding into new markets.  When the Islamic State in Iraq and 
Syria (ISIS) began to generate lower profits from the sale of black market oil, 
it supplemented these losses by trafficking antiquities, managing fish farms, 
and running car dealerships.4 
 
Narcotics trafficking remains one of the most common and most lucrative 
forms of criminality on which terrorists rely in order to finance their 
organizations and activities.  Due to high pecuniary value and the low volume 
to value ratio of smuggling and trafficking illicit narcotics (cocaine, ecstasy, 
heroin, hashish, marijuana, methamphetamine, opiates, etc.) and the 
chemical precursors required to manufacture some of these drugs, this 
criminal activity is an attractive one for terrorists or insurgents.5  In addition 
to money, the narcotics trade in drug-producing countries has the potential to 
provide terrorists with recruits and sympathizers among “impoverished, 
                                                          
1 Clarke, Colin P., Terrorism, Inc.: The Financing of Terrorism, Insurgency and 
Irregular Warfare, (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International, 2015). 
2 Victor Comras, “Al Qaeda Finances and Funding to Affiliated Groups,” in Terrorism 
Financing and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective (Redwood City, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2007), 122–123; Matthew Levitt, “Al-Qa’ida’s Finances: 
Evidence of Organizational Decline? CTC Sentinel, 1:5 (April 2008); and Juan Miguel del 
Cid Gomez, “A Financial Profile of the Terrorism of Al-Qaeda and Its Affiliates,” 
Perspectives on Terrorism, 4:4 (October 2010). 
3 Thomas M. Sanderson, “Transnational Terror and Organized Crime: Blurring the 
Lines,” SAIS Review, 24:1 (Winter-Spring 2004): 52. 
4 Stephen Kalin, “Islamic State Turns To Selling Fish, Cars To Offset Oil Losses: Report,” 
Reuters, April 28, 2016, available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-
islamicstate-finances-idUSKCN0XP2CV. 
5 For more on the network aspect of drug trafficking, see Phil Williams, “The Nature of 
Drug-Trafficking Networks,” Current History (April 1998): 154–159. 
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neglected, isolated farmers” who can help cultivate drug crops while also 
serving as a bulwark against pro-government groups and anti-drug 
campaigns.6 
 
To date, much of the literature on the financing of terrorism and insurgency 
has focused at the transnational-level on groups involved in financing their 
organizations through involvement in the drug trade.7  This article discusses 
some of those implications, but argues that to better understand the threat 
faced by the new generation of jihadists in the West, security forces and 
intelligence services must also look at how lower-level trafficking, drug 
dealing, and petty criminal activity, at the local level, combined with prison 
radicalization and ties to the black market and illicit underworld, combine to 
present a new spin on a longstanding threat.  To be sure, the local level is even 
more difficult to counter, given already poor community-police cooperation 
and relations in the marginalized communities throughout the West.  Further, 
the threat from drug trafficking at the local level can be equally as nefarious, 
as smaller cells are given greater autonomy to finance plots, recruit new 
members and ultimately conduct attacks in developed democracies. 
 
Involvement in the Drug Trade 
Involvement in the narcotics trade can bring together terrorist or insurgent 
groups and drug cartels.8  Furthermore, the demise of the latter could present 
opportunities for terrorists or insurgents to fill the void, as in Colombia when 
FARC took over some of the territory previously controlled by the Medellin 
and Cali cartels in the 1990s.  Other times, as with the Kurdistan Workers’ 
Party (PKK) and its drug trafficking activities in Europe, rather than 
cooperate with traditional criminal enterprises, insurgent or terrorist groups 
seek to drive them out of the market to supplant them themselves.9  Finally, 
as we have seen with the relationship between drug traffickers and Sendero 
                                                          
6 Rollins, John and Liana Sun-Wyler, Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Foreign 
Policy Issues for Congress, CRS Report R41004, (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 
2012): 10, available at: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41004.pdf. See also, 
Vanda Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs, 
(Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2010). 
7 Victor Asal et al., “When Terrorists Go Bad: Analyzing Terrorist Organizations’ 
Involvement in Drug Smuggling,” International Studies Quarterly, 59:1 (March 2015): 
112-123. See also, Michael Kenney, From Pablo to Osama: Trafficking and Terrorist 
Networks, Government Bureaucracies, and Competitive Adaptation, (University Park, 
PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2008). 
8 Chris Dishman, “The Leaderless Nexus: When Crime and Terror Converge,” Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism, 28:3 (2005): 246. 
9 Phil Williams, “Insurgencies and Organized Crime,” in Drug Trafficking, Violence, and 
Instability, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 
(April 2012): 32. 
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Luminoso in Peru, the dominant party in the relationship can change over 
time.  In the 1990s, a powerful (and brutal) Sendero held sway, while more 
recently, especially in the Valley of the Apurimac and Ene River (VRAE), the 
insurgents have been keen to play a more secondary role.10 
 
Narcotics remain both the most common and most lucrative form of 
organized crime used by terrorist groups, including well-known traffickers 
like the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA),11 Basque Homeland and Liberty or 
ETA in Spain, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).12  Profits 
derived from drug trafficking have enabled groups like FARC to obtain 
sophisticated weapons and communications technology.13  More recently, an 
investigation in Australia uncovered 40 separate money laundering 
operations in that country, one of which delivered proceeds from drug 
trafficking to Hezbollah.14  The cultivation of illicit crops like poppy or coca is 
labor-intensive and provides employment to hundreds of thousands to 
millions of people in particular countries, including Afghanistan and 
Colombia, respectively.15  Producer countries are often the least profitable 
part of the process; the lion’s share of earnings is garnered by those who 
refine and market the drugs.16 
 
Historical Examples 
The examples of insurgent and terrorist groups relying on criminal activities 
to fund their organizations, particularly drug trafficking, are abundant in both 
historical and contemporary cases.  Moreover, no single typology of terrorist 
or insurgent group can claim the mantle of relying on narcotics to finance its 
activities.  From the Cold War era to modern times, the examples span ethno-
nationalist groups, separatists, Marxist-oriented organizations and religious 
groups alike, making it difficult to predict which groups may be more or less 
likely to rely on this method of raising funds.  
                                                          
10 Ibid., 33. 
11 Dishman, “Leaderless Nexus,” 43. 
12 Sanderson, “Blurring the Lines,” 52. See also Williams, “Insurgencies and Organized 
Crime,” 44. 
13 Sanderson, “Blurring the Lines,” 51. 
14 Nick McKenzie and Richard Baker, “Terrorists Taking Cut of Millions in Drug Money,” 
The Sydney Morning Herald, January 23, 2014, available 
at:http://www.smh.com.au/national/terrorists-taking-cut-of-millions-in-drug-money-
20140122-3196s.html. 
15 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Fighting the Nexus,” in Drug Trafficking, Violence, and 
Instability, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 
(April 2012): 5. 
16 Louise I. Shelley and John T. Picarelli, “Methods Not Motives: Implications of the 
Convergence of International Organized Crime and Terrorism, Police Practice and 
Research, 3:4 (2002): 313. 
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Among the most prolific terrorist organizations to rely on narcotics trafficking 
to fund its activities was the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri 
Lanka.  Involvement in the drug trade first became apparent as early as 1984 
when Swiss police reported that Tamils were responsible for trafficking 
approximately 20 percent of the heroin coming into the country.17  The “Tamil 
connection” in Switzerland, as it came to be known, was eventually 
dismantled by the police, although the drug market in Sri Lanka itself 
expanded, with an estimated 100,000 users by the end of the 1990s.18  Italian 
police also broke up several Tamil heroin rings throughout the 1980s.  Sri 
Lanka’s geographic proximity to the Golden Triangle of Laos, Myanmar, and 
Thailand, combined with the LTTE’s advanced maritime capabilities made 
heroin trafficking an obvious racket for the group to pursue.  The LTTE also 
extended operations into Pakistan, where its members linked up with 
notorious Indian crime boss Dawood Ibrahim and his “D-Company” gang. 
They used the port city of Karachi to solidify a foothold in South Asia and 
diversify smuggling activities to include humans, in addition to heroin.19 
 
Other groups, such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), had an 
ambiguous relationship with the drug trade over time.  In Republican 
neighborhoods, there was a tacit understanding that one had to pay 
“revolutionary” taxes to avoid drawing the ire of the Provos and there exists 
widespread speculation that the PIRA profited from the selling of drugs, 
although the group was not actively smuggling and trafficking narcotics 
itself.20  Still, some PIRA members did “take a cut” of the profits earned by 
drug dealers operating on territory dominated by the group.  At various 
points, the PIRA was also known to “ride shotgun,” or provide armed escort 
on international drug shipments.21 
 
                                                          
17 Weiss, Gordon, The Cage: The Fight for Sri Lanka and the Last Days of the Tamil 
Tigers, (London, England: Bodley Head, 2011), 89. 
18 Williams, “Insurgencies and Organized Crime,” 46. 
19 Phil Williams, “Terrorist Financing and Organized Crime: Nexus, Appropriation, or 
Transformation?” in Countering the Financing of Terrorism, (London, England: 
Routledge, 2008): 139. 
20 There is a fierce debate in the literature over whether or not the PIRA engaged in drug 
trafficking. Because a consensus has never been reached, this paper eschews further 
analysis of the issue. For a thoughtful and balanced analysis of the debate, see John 
Horgan and Max Taylor, “Playing Green Card—Financing the Provisional IRA: Part I,” 
Terrorism and Political Violence, 11:2 (Summer 1999): 2; 24–30, available at:  
http://www.academia.edu/3882176/Playing_the_Green_Card_-
_Financing_the_Provisional_IRA_Part_1. 
21  “Riding shotgun” is a term used for providing an armed escort on international drug 
shipments. See Horgan and Taylor, “Playing the Green Card, Part 1,” 8. 
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Two well-known terrorist groups in the Middle East have both been 
associated with involvement in the drug trade at various points: Hezbollah 
and Hamas.  Known Hezbollah supporters and brothers, Ali Farhat and 
Hassan Farhat, were accused of trafficking cocaine, heroin, and marijuana, in 
collaboration with a Nigerian drug dealer in possession of a Canadian 
immigration document.22  More broadly, Hezbollah has also dealt 
methamphetamine and in the last several years has been receptive to a 
burgeoning relationship with Mexican drug cartels.  Hezbollah operatives 
have been accused of trafficking in arms, drugs, and women.  Indeed, 
Hezbollah operatives have been tied to drug operations in Poland, Hungary, 
Moldova, the Balkans, and Romania.23 
 
Hamas has taken advantage of the Muslim diaspora in South America’s semi-
lawless tri-border area, a region known for money laundering, drug 
trafficking, and a host of other illicit and unsavory activities.24  In the tri-
border area of Latin America, it is well-known that Hamas (perhaps 
emulating Hezbollah) has established partnerships with various drug 
trafficking organizations.25  The group has also been involved with drugs in 
the United States, at least on the margins–a pseudoephedrine smuggling 
scam in the Midwest United States involved bank accounts tied to Hamas.26 
 
As the noose was tightened around charities that funded al-Qaida after 9/11, 
the group attempted to diversify its revenue sources, to include garnering 
money earned through drug trafficking, particularly through an alliance with 
the IMU in Central Asia, but also in North Africa by one of its affiliates.  In the 
latter case, al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has been linked to 
Colombian cocaine traffickers in a quid pro quo relationship that brings cash 
to the terrorists while providing the traffickers with unfettered access (and in 
some cases, heavily armed escorts) across the desert region between 
Mauritania, Mali, and Algeria, where narcotics transit through on their way to 
a growing European market. In addition to money obtained through 
                                                          
22 Levitt, Matthew, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God, 
(Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 320. 
23 Ibid., 227. 
24 Sanderson, “Blurring the Lines,” 53. 
25 Clare Ribando Seelke et al., “Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking 
and U.S. Counterdrug Programs,” CRS Report R41215, (Washington, D.C.: Library of 
Congress, 2011): 6, available at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34112.pdf. 
26 Matthew Levitt, “Hezbollah: Financing Terror Through Criminal Enterprise,” 
Testimony presented to United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, May 25, 2005: 10, available at: 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/html/pdf/hezbollah-testimony-05252005.pdf. 
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kidnapping for ransom (KFR), AQIM earns significant sums of money from 
trafficking cocaine and synthetic drugs between Spain and Algeria.27  
 
Perhaps the most prolific terrorist organization associated with drug 
trafficking today is the Afghan Taliban.  On narcotics, the Taliban’s position 
has evolved considerably throughout the years and at different points the 
group has knowingly suppressed the cultivation of poppy in Afghanistan in 
order to manipulate the international market price.  At one point, a Taliban 
ban on poppy cultivation suppressed the supply by 90 percent, thus 
increasing the value of the group’s stocks by ten times the price.28  While the 
Taliban flip flopped back and forth on its stance toward involvement in the 
illicit narcotics trade between 1994 and 2001, its position since then has been 
consistent for the most part.29  Once the insurgency began in earnest, Taliban 
fighters made a series of shrewd maneuvers, including the advancement of 
loans to opium farmers in order to obtain their backing whilst simultaneously 
ensuring a future source of revenue.30  Keeping in line with its renewed 
offensive to win “hearts and minds,” the Taliban now actively promotes the 
growing of poppy and provides protection to farmers growing the crop.31   
 
From Local to Global and Back Again 
A study by Emilie Oftedal of the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment 
(FFI) looked at data on the financing of 40 jihadi cells that have plotted 
attacks against European targets between 1994 and 2013 and concluded that 
the second most common method of funding for these attacks (in 28% of 
cases analyzed) was illicit trade (which included drugs, cars, forged 
documents, and weapons).32  Three-quarters of the plots cost less than 
                                                          
27 Gomez, “Financial Profile of Al-Qaeda,”12–13. 
28 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Kicking the Opium Habit? Afghanistan’s Drug Economy and 
Politics Since the 1980s,” Conflict, Security, and Development, 6:2, (Summer 2006): 127-
149, available at: 
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Kicking%20the%20opium%20habit%20Afgh
anistan%20s%20drug%20economy%20and%20politics%20since%20the%201980s.pdf. 
29 One exception was when Taliban fighters destroyed fields of opium poppies in eastern 
Afghanistan, the first time since 2001. Emma Graham-Harrison, “Taliban Destroy Poppy 
Fields in Surprise Clampdown on Afghan Opium Growers,” The Guardian, May 20, 2012, 
available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/may/20/taliban-destroy-
poppy-afghan-opium. 
30 Peters, Gretchen, Seeds of Terror: How Drugs, Thugs, and Crime Are Reshaping the 
Afghan War, (New York, NY: St Martin’s, 2009).   
31 Alia Brahimi, “The Taliban’s Evolving Ideology,” London School of Economics Global 
Governance Working Paper 02/2010 (July 2010): 9, available at:  
http://www.lse.ac.uk/globalGovernance/publications/workingPapers/WP022010.pdf. 
32 Emilie Oftedal, “The Financing of Jihadi Terrorist Cells in Europe,” Norwegian 
Defence Research Establishment (FFI), January 6, 2015: 16, available at: 
http://www.ffi.no/no/Rapporter/14-02234.pdf; The use of personal assets was the most 
common method of funding. 
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$10,000 to plan.33  The 2004 Madrid train bombings killed 191 people and 
injured another 1,600 in an attack financed primarily by the leader of a small, 
yet effective, drug trafficking network that smuggled hash from Morocco and 
ecstasy from Holland to Spain.34  Relatively small amounts of money could 
just as easily be used to plot and conduct a terrorist attack in Western Europe 
similar to the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris in January 2015 or the 
Copenhagen attacks the following month.  And while the Charlie Hebdo 
attack was allegedly funded with $20,000 from AQAP, it is easy to see why 
some terrorists planning similar types of attacks would follow the Madrid 
model–small sums of money collected over time through the use of somewhat 
banal criminal activities like drug dealing, various types of fraud, and petty 
theft.35  Besides the 2004 Madrid cell, proceeds from drug trafficking are also 
suspected of funding another plot against Madrid aimed at the National Court 
(2004), the Hofstad Group in Holland (2004), a Swedish cell (2010), 
Mohammed Merah’s rampage (2012), and an attack at a kosher supermarket 
in Paris (2012).36   
 
Indeed, where the concept of a nexus between crime and terrorism might be 
most interesting is the emerging profile of small-time crook to terrorist, a 
profile which is now emerging in many of the jihadist attacks and plots 
recently targeting Europe.  As Williams notes, “with continued politicization 
and radicalization of organized crime, instances of transformation from 
criminal or drug trafficker to terrorist and from criminal enterprise to 
terrorist organization will become more frequent.”37  Abdelhamid Abaaoud, 
the leader of the Paris November 2015 attacks, Ahmed Coulibaly, a key figure 
in the Charlie Hebdo attacks, and numerous other terrorists were involved in 
various forms of criminality before becoming jihadists.38  Mohamed 
                                                          
33 Oftedal, “The Financing of Jihadi Terrorist Cells in Europe,” 3-7. 
34 Phil Williams, “In Cold Blood: The Madrid Bombings,” Perspectives on Terrorism 
(June 2008): 22, available at: 
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/50/html. For a 
more in-depth analysis of the Madrid bombings, see Phil Williams, “The Madrid Train 
Bombings,” in Fighting Back: What Governments Can Do About Terrorism, (Redwood 
City, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 298-316. 
35 Eric Schmitt, Mark Mazzetti and Rukmini Callimachi, “Disputed Claims Over Qaeda 
Role in Paris Attacks,” New York Times, January 14, 2015, available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/15/world/europe/al-qaeda-in-the-arabian-
peninsula-charlie-hebdo.html. 
36 Oftedal, “The Financing of Jihadi Terrorist Cells in Europe.”  
37 Phil Williams and Joshua T. Hoffman, “Drug Trafficking and Terrorism: Devil’s Brew 
or Caffeinated Soda,” Unpublished paper, undated. 
38 Simon Cottee, “Reborn Into Terrorism,” The Atlantic, January 25, 2016, available at:  
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/01/isis-criminals-
converts/426822/. See also, Anthony Faiola and Souad Mekhennet, “The Islamic State 
Creates a New Type of Jihadist: Part Terrorist, Part Gangster,” The Washington Post, 
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Lahouaiej Bouhlel, the terrorist who killed 84 people by driving a truck 
through a crowd on Bastille Day in Nice, France, also had a history of petty 
crime.39  A study by Edwin Bakker on jihadi terrorists in Europe found that 
about a quarter of terrorists sampled in the study had a criminal record while 
many had been involved in various forms of crime without having been in 
prison or sentenced  in a different way.40  A more recent study, focused 
strictly on ISIS, found that of 58 individuals linked to 32 ISIS-related plots in 
the West between July 2014 and August 2015, 22 percent had a past criminal 
record or were in contact with law enforcement.  The most common felonies 
were related to drugs.41  Finally, recent analysis by Sam Mullins noted that, of 
47 cases of jihadist-inspired violence carried out in Western countries 
between January 1, 2012 and June 12, 2016, half of the attackers had a 
criminal past.42 
 
Are Drugs Funding ISIS? 
It is well established that the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is the 
wealthiest terror group in modern history, having built a nascent war chest of 
approximately $500 million after looting bank vaults throughout northern 
Iraq.43  One of the reasons ISIS has been so successful in financing its 
organization has been the group’s ability to earn vast sums of income from 
several different revenue streams.  To date, two sources of revenue in 
particular have provided ISIS with the lion’s share of its wealth–oil and 
taxation/extortion.  But an outstanding question remains whether ISIS does 
now, or may in the future, seek to diversify its activities to include drug 
                                                          
December 20, 2015, available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/the-
islamic-state-creates-a-new-type-of-jihadist-part-terrorist-part-
gangster/2015/12/20/1a3d65da-9bae-11e5-aca6-1ae3be6f06d2_story.html. 
39 Alissa J. Rubin, Lilia Blaise, Adam Nossiter, and Aurelien Breeden, “France Says Truck 
Attacker Was Tunisia Native With Record of Petty Crime,” New York Times, July 15, 
2016, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/16/world/europe/attack-nice-
bastille-day.html. 
40 Edwin Bakker, “Jihadi Terrorists in Europe: Their Characteristics and the 
Circumstances in Which They Joined the Jihad, An Exploratory Study,” (Netherlands 
Institute of International Relations: Clingendael, December 2006): 48, available at: 
http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20061200_cscp_csp_bakker.pdf. 
41 Robin Simcox, “‘We Will Conquer Your Rome’: A Study of Islamic State Terror Plots in 
the West,” The Henry Jackson Society, Center for the Response to Radicalisation and 
Terrorism (CRT), 2015: 3. 
42 Sam Mullins, “The Road to Orlando: Jihadist-Inspired Violence in the West, 2012-
2016,” CTC Sentinel, June 2016: 26-30, available at: 
https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-road-to-orlando-jihadist-inspired-violence-in-
the-west-2012-2016. 
43 Daniel L. Glaser, Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing, U.S. Treasury, “Testimony 
of A\S for Terrorist Financing Daniel L. Glaser Before The House Committee on Foreign 
Affair's Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, and House Committee 
on Armed Services' Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities,” June 9, 2016. 
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trafficking.44  While there is no current evidence indicating in-depth 
involvement in the smuggling or sale of narcotics45, it is important to note 
that many ISIS recruits, particularly those from Europe, have relied on drug 
trafficking as a means of generating revenue at a low level in what Magnus 
Ranstorp has called “micro-financing the Caliphate.”46  It is not necessarily 
that the sale of drugs goes directly into ISIS coffers, but proceeds garnered 
from peddling narcotics affords jihadists in Europe the financial flexibility to 
travel back and forth to Syria as well as to save the money to help procure the 
resources necessary for planning a terrorist attack (e.g. weapons, vehicles, cell 
phones). 
 
ISIS’s predecessor, Al Qaida in Iraq (AQI), was led by a criminal-cum-jihadist 
named Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, whose background included street gangs and 
prison time for sexual assault.47  Indeed, ISIS seems to attract many jihadists 
with a similar profile, including the main link between the Paris November 
2015 attacks and the Brussels March 2016 bombings, Salah Abdesalam, 
known by his penchant for drinking, smoking, and gambling, rather than his 
piety.48  Abdesalam was a regular patron (and brother of the manager) of a 
Molenbeek bar named Café del Beguines, a place known for drug dealing and 
                                                          
44 Eric W. Schoon, “ISIS, Ideology, and the Illicit Drug Economy,” Political Violence @ a 
Glance, July 24, 2015, available at: 
https://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2015/07/24/isis-ideology-and-the-illicit-drug-
economy/. 
45 It should be noted, however, that some allegations have been made. See Damien 
Sharkov, “Islamic State Use Drug Trade to Bankroll Their Jihad, Says Spanish 
Intelligence,” Newsweek, October 20, 2014, available at: 
http://www.newsweek.com/islamic-state-use-drug-trade-bankroll-their-jihad-says-
spanish-intelligence-278465; and “High Finance: ISIS Generates Up to $1bn Annually 
from Trafficking Afghan Heroin,” RT, March 6, 2015; Tess Owen, “The Islamic State May 
Have Gotten Caught Smuggling a Huge Shipment of Opiates to Libya,” Vice News, June 
7, 2016, available at: https://news.vice.com/article/the-islamic-state-may-have-gotten-
caught-smuggling-a-huge-shipment-of-opiates-to-libya; and Tom Porter, “Cocaine 
Funding ISIS: Drug Smuggling Profits Islamic State-Linked Jihadists in North Africa,” 
International Business Times, November 20, 2014, available at: 
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/cocaine-funding-isis-drug-smuggling-profits-islamic-state-
linked-jihadists-north-africa-1475824. 
46 Magnus Ranstorp, “Microfinancing the Caliphate: How the Islamic State is Unlocking 
the Assets of European Recruits,” CTC Sentinel, May 25, 2016, available at: 
https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/microfinancing-the-caliphate-how-the-islamic-state-
is-unlocking-the-assets-of-european-recruits.  
47 Mary Anne Weaver, “The Short, Violent Life of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,” The Atlantic, 
July/August 2006, available at:  
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/07/the-short-violent-life-of-abu-
musab-al-zarqawi/304983/.  
48 Simon Cottee, “Europe’s Joint Smoking, Gay-Club Hopping Terrorists,” Foreign Policy, 
April 13, 2016, available at: http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/13/the-joint-smoking-
gay-club-hopping-terrorists-of-molenbeek-abdeslam-radicalization/. 
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other illicit activity and shuttered after “compromising public security and 
tranquility.”49   
 
Involvement in crime, especially drug trafficking, can lead to prison, which in 
some cases serves as an incubator for religious radicalization and violent 
extremism.  As criminals become radicalized, this potentially increases 
involvement in the plotting and execution of terrorist attacks.50  A 2012 report 
by the European Parliament titled “Europe’s Crime-Terror Nexus: Links 
Between Terrorist and Organised Crime Groups in the European Union” 
noted the prevalence with which jihadist attacks involved links to criminality, 
including drug trafficking.51  In some sense, a background in the criminal 
underworld left behind for militant Islam can play into the appeal of what has 
been called “jihadi cool,” which blends “traditional notions of honor and 
virility, but also a strong undercurrent of oppositional, postmodern cool.”52 
 
The modus operandi ISIS has developed for generating foreign fighters and 
for relying on smaller cells of attackers to both raise funds and to carry out 
attacks external to the main theatre of operations (e.g. in Europe instead of 
the Middle East) works particularly well with a local criminal funding model.  
This model fits into how ISIS conceives of extra-territorial contributions on a 
tactical level.  Terrorist organizations other than ISIS may have less of an 
affinity for this model, especially those that place a high value on political 
coherence and central control, with funds being central to the management of 
more disparate elements.53  But for ISIS, this model works extremely well for 
several reasons.  First, ISIS has less concern than other groups about what 
happens outside of the Caliphate.  Second, the eschatological stance of ISIS 
                                                          
49 Andrew Higgins et al., “In Suspects’ Brussels Neighborhood, a History of Petty Crimes 
and Missed Chances,” New York Times, November 16, 2015, available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/17/world/europe/in-suspects-brussels-
neighborhood-a-history-of-petty-crimes-and-missed-chances.html.  
50 This is not to suggest that jail or prison is the only factor in the radicalization process. 
To be sure, this analysis is not meant to be causal, merely a narrative of how some cases 
unfold. A robust discussion of the causes of radicalization is beyond the scope of this 
article, but suffice to say it results from a combination of economic, social, political, 
religious and cultural factors/variables including wide-ranging grievances.  
51 Tamara Makarenko, “Increasingly Vulnerable,” The Cipher Brief, April 27, 2016 
available at: https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/europe/increasingly-vulnerable-
1089. 
52 Simon Cottee, “The Challenge of Jihadi Cool,” The Atlantic, December 24, 2015, 
available at: http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/12/isis-jihadi-
cool/421776/. See also, Thomas Hegghammer, “The Soft Power of Militant Jihad,” New 
York Times, December 18, 2015, available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/20/opinion/sunday/militant-jihads-softer-
side.html. 
53 Andrew Liepman and Colin P. Clarke, “Demystifying ISIS,” U.S. News & World Report, 
August 23, 2016. 
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offers a redemptive narrative for petty criminals to carry out terrorist 
attacks.54 
 
All of this suggests a real challenge for law enforcement authorities and 
intelligence agencies.  These entities are already stretched thin and hurting 
for resources, concentrating (rightly so) on significant threats like the return 
of foreign fighters from Iraq, Syria, and other jihadist hotspots throughout the 
globe.  Where these fighters are part of an existing network with roots 
stretching back to neighborhoods like Molenbeek, Belgium, the Liselby 
district of Fredrikstad in Norway, or the banlieues of Paris, the threat 
becomes even more significant.  To be sure, ISIS training camps are “the 
breeding grounds of tomorrow’s Brussels or Paris attacks.”55  
 
According to a report on foreign fighters by The Soufan Group, European 
countries account for a significant percentage of Islamic State recruits from 
outside of the Middle East (see Table 1 below).  Perhaps even more troubling, 
roughly 3700 of the 5,000 plus European Union foreign fighter contingent 
come from just four countries–France (1700), Germany (760), Belgium (470) 
and the United Kingdom (760).56 
 
Table 1: Estimated Number of Foreign Fighters from European 
Countries57 
Country Estimated Number of Foreign 
Fighters 
Albania 90 
Austria 300 
Belgium 470 
Bosnia 330 
Denmark 125 
Finland 70 
France 1700 
                                                          
54 Mitch Prothero, “Why Europe Can’t Find the Jihadis in Its Midst,” BuzzFeed News, 
August 21, 2016, available at: https://www.buzzfeed.com/mitchprothero/why-europe-
cant-find-the-jihadis-in-its-midst?utm_term=.uu0KYLkw1#.ls4bY469K. 
55 Benjamin Bahney et al., “Striking Back at the Islamic State’s Foreign Fighter Pipeline,” 
The National Interest, May 31, 2016, available at: http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-
buzz/striking-back-the-islamic-states-foreign-fighter-pipeline-16405. 
56 “Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria 
and Iraq,” The Soufan Group, December 2015: 12, available at: 
http://soufangroup.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/12/TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate1.pdf. 
57 Ibid., 7-10. 
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Germany 760 
Ireland 30 
Italy 87 
Kosovo 232 
Macedonia 146 
Netherlands 220 
Norway 81 
Spain 133 
Sweden 300 
Switzerland 57 
United Kingdom 760 
 
So while drugs might not be directly funding ISIS, the sale of drugs (in 
addition to other forms of petty crime) by the group’s European recruits 
seems noteworthy on several levels.  Besides the functional component of 
providing jihadists with funds, drug trafficking also puts terrorists in touch 
with criminals and helps expand illicit networks, many of which are critical to 
the facilitation of a terrorist attack.58  In April 2016, the Director of National 
Intelligence, James R. Clapper, Jr., publicly stated that ISIS is operating 
clandestine terrorist cells in Britain, Germany, and Italy.59  And although the 
director did not go into detail on how these cells were funded, it seems likely 
to assume that many of the individuals comprising these cells could be 
connected to local criminal elements, including drug traffickers.  It is unclear 
how many individuals belonging to ISIS are in Europe, but the group has 
boasted that it sent “many operatives” to the Continent disguised among the 
hordes of refugees that has streamed in over the past several years.60  To be 
sure, many are also homegrown. 
 
                                                          
58 Timothy Holman, “‘Gonna Get Myself Connected’: The Role of Facilitation in Foreign 
Fighter Mobilizations,” Perspectives on Terrorism, 10:2 (2016) available at: 
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/497/html. 
59 Eric Schmitt and Alissa J. Rubin, “ISIS is Spreading in Europe, U.S. Intelligence Chief 
Warns,” New York Times, April 25, 2016, available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/26/us/politics/isis-spreading-in-europe-clapper-
warns.html. 
60 Anthony Faiola and Souad Mekhennet, “Tracing the Path of Four Terrorists Sent to 
Europe by the Islamic State,” Washington Post, April 22, 2016, available at:  
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/how-europes-migrant-
crisis-became-an-opportunity-for-isis/2016/04/21/ec8a7231-062d-4185-bb27-
cc7295d35415_story.html. 
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Conclusion 
This endemic criminal violence that results from every step of the drug 
trafficking value chain erodes state institutions and is often difficult to 
reverse.  The international community must figure out a way to deal with the 
spill-over violence and the human security implications, including refugee 
flows, addiction, disease, corruption, and general instability generated from 
the illicit trade in illegal narcotics.  Where criminal violence should be 
considered acutely problematic is in cases where it merges with traditional 
forms of political violence like terrorism and insurgency.  In these cases, 
criminality (and the violence that often accompanies criminality) helps fund 
the insurgency and groups can morph over time into criminal-insurgent 
hybrids.  Moreover, war profiteers disguised as rebels seek to enact strategies 
that will serve to prolong the conflict as a means of continuing to reap the 
economic benefits, as in conflict zones throughout the globe, from the jungles 
of Colombia to the mountains of Afghanistan.   
 
The clearest implication for international security policy is the need to 
become more effective at building the capacity of states to combat 
transnational organized crime and criminal violence.  This can be 
accomplished through focusing security cooperation efforts in vulnerable 
countries on ministerial capacity, institution building, and defense reform, all 
of which are foundational to other forms of capacity, like border control and 
anti-corruption efforts.61  Furthermore, ministerial capacity can be improved 
even when the partner nation’s absorptive capacity is generally low.  This is a 
self-reinforcing cycle since ministerial capacity building can itself improve a 
partner’s absorptive capacity, thus enabling future capacity building in other 
areas.  Best practices and lessons learned, gleaned from higher-level strategic 
analyses, should be revisited in order to determine potential synergies 
applicable to more parochial settings.  
 
Low-level criminality and petty drug dealing are no longer strictly the domain 
of local law enforcement.  This issue is now a critical counterterrorism 
concern.  As this article has demonstrated, there are numerous links between 
criminality and terrorism, especially in Europe, and numerous ISIS militants 
have ties to the illicit underworld and black market.  Further probing into 
what at first seem like local criminal elements may shed light on broader 
networks with connections to terrorist groups in the Middle East and North 
Africa.  And while the actual “day of attack” cost is low, these cells can be 
                                                          
61 Walter L. Perry, Defense Institution Building: An Assessment (Santa Monica, CA: 
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connected to a broader infrastructure and support network like ISIL’s 
external operations branch.62 
In Europe, preventing attacks like the Paris November 2015 attack and the 
Brussels March 2016 attack require local police forces to work closely with 
state and European Union officials, better integrating grass roots intelligence 
with profiles and backgrounds of individuals that have been identified as 
foreign terrorists fighters, especially those seeking to return to Europe.  This 
will prove to be a major challenge, as many local police departments are 
plagued by a shortage of resources.  Moreover, the decentralized nature of 
some city governments–Brussels has 19 separate administrative police 
districts that operate independently and three separate administrations for 
the government, NATO, and the EU–make countering crime at any level a 
major challenge.63 
 
The onus is on federal and state agencies to work together with local 
departments to identify potential areas of concern and help provide the 
resources–manpower, training, material–necessary to help mitigate the 
threat.  To give a sense of the magnitude of the challenge, consider that it 
takes a country like France 20 agents to monitor just one suspect for 24 hour 
surveillance.  France currently has approximately 10,000 names on its “S-
List,” which is a database of people believed to have been radicalized.64  
 
With sufficient ministerial capacity, countries plagued by high levels of illicit 
trade and criminal violence will be better prepared to plan and integrate 
strategy and operations against the range of threats arrayed against them.  
States need to be better prepared to exploit potential vulnerabilities.  In cases 
                                                          
62 Nicole Magney and Paul Cruickshank, “A View from the CT Foxhole: Adam Szubin, 
Acting Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, U.S. Dept of Treasury,” 
CTC Sentinel, August 22, 2016, available at: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/a-view-
from-the-ct-foxhole-adam-szubin-acting-under-secretary-for-terrorism-and-financial-
intelligence-u-s-dept-of-treasury. See also, Rukmini Callimachi, “How A Secretive 
Branch of ISIS Built a Global Network of Killers,” New York Times, August 3, 2016, 
available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/04/world/middleeast/isis-german-
recruit-interview.html; and Eric Schmitt, “As ISIS Loses Land, It Gains Ground In 
Overseas Terror,” New York Times, July 3, 2016, available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/04/world/middleeast/isis-terrorism.html. 
63 Ian Traynor, “The Language Divide at the Heart of a Split That is Tearing Belgium 
Apart,” The Guardian, May 8, 2010, available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/may/09/belgium-flanders-wallonia-
french-dutch. 
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Thought?” New York Times, June 21, 2016 available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/22/world/europe/france-orlando-isis-terrorism-
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where terrorists or insurgents are cooperating with criminals, this opens the 
door for the possibility of infiltration by law enforcement and intelligence 
agents.  Along these same lines, states should seek to develop counter-
narratives that discredit the ideological appeal of terrorists and insurgents by 
emphasizing their linkage to common criminality. 
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